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1. Introduction
A recent survey has shown that the major problem faced by firms in Latin American countries is
difficulty in accessing financial markets. Figure 1 summarizes the findings of the Business

















Which of the following factors, for the operation and growth of your business, is the single most
important obstacle?
Street Crime
The Main Obstacles to Growth
Latin America vs. Developed Countries
Source: Business Environment Survey
The degree to which firms face financial constraints varies across countries. In some
countries the problem is more pronounced than in others, as shown in Figure 2. However, in 18
out of 20 Latin American countries surveyed, access to credit was reported as the most important
concern of entrepreneurs. This concern is completely justified. Using microeconomic data for
over 50 countries, Lora et al. (2001) have found that the major determinant of a firm’s growth is
access to financial markets. In countries where credit constraints are tighter, firms are unable to
grow.  They find that the elasticity of the average of total assets for the largest 25 firms in each
country, with respect to a financial depth measure, ranges between 0.5 and 0.8 and is statistically
significant. Their results imply that countries with tighter credit constraints will host firms with
severe impediments to expansion.4
Figure 2.






















Is financing a major obstacle to the
growth of the company?
Source: Business Environment Survey.
The question of why financial constraints are more pronounced in some countries than
others has many facets. Macroeconomic issues such as monetary shocks (Bernanke and Blinder,
1988; Freixas and Rochet, 1998) or productivity shocks (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) are most
relevant, as well as microeconomic issues related to information asymmetries and the degree of
development of information-sharing institutions such as credit bureaus, credit registries and
credit-rating agencies (Pagano and Japelli, 1993, 1999). Additionally, more structural aspects
such as the institutions that support financial contracts can also help explain the international
evidence on financial constraints.  As this paper will argue, institutions play a major role in
explaining the reduced financial depth of some Latin American countries.
A credit contract involves three players: the creditor, the debtor, and the institutions that
guarantee that each of the other parties will live up to its responsibilities. If institutions are
inadequate it is likely that the benefits that the other parties have to gain from reneging on the
debt contract can be pronounced enough to prevent the contract’s realization. Hence, the ability
of these institutions to align the players’ incentives with the clauses of the debt contract can
become an engine of promotion of financial breadth. The nature of the rules and regulations that
surround financial markets can influence the degree of expansion of credit markets and can also
explain the diverse response of different countries’ credit markets to similar types of shocks.5
  Recent papers have explored the roles of regulations on creditors’ rights to assets
pledged as collateral in bankruptcy events in explaining the breadth of financial markets
1 and in
explaining the variety of responses of the credit market to shocks.
2 Creditor rights protection
encourages both lenders and borrowers to enter into financial contracts and to abide by their
clauses. This paper summarizes the discussion and presents new empirical evidence that strongly
supports the importance of effective creditor rights protection.
2. The Role of Creditor Rights in Financial Markets: Granting Access to
Collateral
Advocates of creditor rights-oriented regulations claim that if the right to repossess collateral in
case of debtor default is not strictly protected, the use of collateral will lose its important role in
solving the information asymmetries that can lead to credit rationing and underinvestment. The
use of collateral in debt contracts has been deeply analyzed from a theoretical perspective.
Collateral helps reduce several types of problems that arise when informational asymmetries
between banks and entrepreneurs are present.
Among many uses amply described in Coco (2000), collateral can solve problems
derived from asymmetries in valuation of projects, uncertainty about the quality of projects and
the riskiness of borrowers, and problems related to the cost of monitoring or supervising
borrowers’ behavior. When not dealt with, these problems can lead to partial or complete credit
rationing. Collateral requirements can solve or at least mitigate the impact of these factors on
credit extension.  Chan and Kanatas (1985), for example, argue that collateral can reduce
asymmetric valuation problems, that is, the conflict that arises when borrowers and lenders
disagree about the true value of the project. The main argument is that there is usually less
uncertainty about the value of collateral than the expected return of a project that has not been
undertaken. Hence, if collateral is pledged, lenders will feel more confident and will charge a
lower interest rate than what they would have if the uncertain project itself were the only
guarantee.
                                                          
1 See, for example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Padilla and Requejo (2000), and Galindo and Micco (2001).
2 Galindo and Micco (2001) develop a model in which the asymmetry of responses of credit markets to shocks is
linked to the institutional set-up, and estimate it using a panel of over 50 countries with information ranging from
1990 to 1999.6
Collateral can also reduce credit rationing of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) fashion. The
seminal work by Stiglitz and Weiss suggests that when information is imperfect the credit market
may not clear at a demand and supply equilibrium interest rate; instead, a rationing equilibrium
can arise where supply is lower than demand.  This happens because credit markets operate
under important information asymmetries that lead to the non-market clearing equilibrium and
underinvestment. A priori, the lender has very little information to identify the quality of the
potential borrower (if she is a creditworthy entrepreneur with a high quality project or not) and
the probability of success of the project. If the lender knew the true nature of the borrower and
the project he would charge differential interest rates according to risk types, but when
uncertainty prevails this is not an option, and the lender may have to choose to ration credit in
order to maximize his expected returns.
3   
The Stiglitz and Weiss framework assumes that credit contracts are specified only in the
interest rate. Several authors have argued that once collateral requirements are introduced,
problems derived from information asymmetries are eliminated or at least partially mitigated.
Pledging collateral conveys information about borrowers and about the project itself.
Entrepreneurs with riskier projects will prefer not to pledge high amounts of collateral. In this
sense, Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987a) and Chan and Thakor (1987), show that
collateral requirements can alleviate problems derived from asymmetric information about
project quality. They show that the correlation between the amount of collateral posted and the
average riskiness of projects is negative, hence collateral solves selection problems and improves
the equilibrium allocation of credit.  Collateral can also be used as a screening tool to obtain
                                                          
3 Two main reasons for lenders to ration credit rather than increase the interest rate have been advanced. The first is
based on the adverse selection effects on the pool of borrowers of raising the interest rate. If lenders lack
information about the true nature of the projects of potential borrowers, but assume a strict positive correlation
between project risk and their returns, they can realize that if they increase the interest rate, it is likely that the more
risk-averse individuals will exit the borrowing group. The lower the degree of risk aversion the higher the likelihood
that the borrower will undertake the riskier project. The second effect is related to the possibility that a rise in the
interest rate may induce entrepreneurs to increase the riskiness of their project at the expense of diminishing its
expected profitability. This is associated with moral hazard. Under the same set up as above, incentives for
borrowers to undertake riskier projects can be set if lenders decide to charge higher interest rates. In both cases, an
increase in the interest rates will increase the overall expected bankruptcy probability and will diminish lenders’
expected returns. In order to maximize expected returns, it will be optimal to maintain a relatively low interest rate,
since this may lower the expected default rate of the portfolio. This, however, implies credit rationing and
underinvestment.7
information about the quality of different agents and counteract the adverse selection problem as
in Bester (1985 and 1987).
4
Collateral requirements also reduce moral hazard problems. Under the assumption that
effort brings disutility, and that monitoring costs are high, borrowers may face incentives that
lead them to reduce their efforts to achieve success. Collateral requirements can reduce these
moral hazard problems by adding a potential cost to borrowers if they do not make their best
effort. Additionally, a borrower can be tempted to engage in opportunistic behavior once a credit
has been granted. If the lender cannot monitor the borrower, the latter can choose to invest the
funds in a riskier project than that initially agreed upon, at an interest rate that will not
compensate the lender for the higher risk. The borrower may be willing to divert funds towards
private uses or extract the whole surplus from the project as in Barro (1976) and Black and De
Meza (1992). When collateral requirements are in place this perverse incentive is diminished,
since that sort of action would increase the chance of losing the assets pledged as collateral.
Theoretical findings regarding the role played by collateral in mitigating the problems
that lead to credit rationing are based on the presumption that collateral can be repossessed by
the creditor in case of default. That is, it is presumed that a third party stands ready to protect and
enforce the creditor’s rights over the collateral stipulated in the debt contract. The right to
repossess collateral, as well as efficiency in doing so, acts as a threat that can ensure that
borrowers will not engage in inadequate behaviors. This threat can be good enough to line up the
borrower’s incentives with the clauses of the contract. If lenders feel that regulations do not
protect them, and the chance of taking control over the assets pledged as collateral is at stake,
they are likely to prefer not to extend credit since the implicit bankruptcy risk will severely
reduce their expected earnings, and credit rationing outcome will resurface. Therefore, according
to this line of thought, countries with a higher degree of creditor protection can be expected to
enjoy deeper debt markets since they can take advantage of the use of additional non-interest
clauses such as collateral to mitigate problems derived from information asymmetries.
Additionally, credit protection can reduce the impact of adverse shocks on the credit
cycle. If creditor rights are protected, when the economy faces an adverse shock that increases
credit risk, the extent to which credit is contracted will depend on the regulation regarding
                                                          
4 Besanko and Thakor (1987a) analyze this in detail and show that credit may still be rationed, but constraints are
reduced when compared to the Stiglitz-Weiss outcome.8
collateral repossession. If creditors cannot recover the collateral pledged in case borrowers
default, it is likely that the overall increase in credit risk that is faced in a recession is
exacerbated by the fact that they will not even be able to recover the collateral. In such cases, the
credit market overreacts to the exogenous shock and credit is strongly contracted. The model in
Galindo and Micco (2001) provides a detailed explanation of the impact of creditor-protection
rules and regulations on market breadth and the credit cycle.
3.  Rules and Regulations Regarding Access to Collateral
In order to test the validity of the previous discussion one needs a proper indication of how
difficult it can be for a creditor to take over collateral. Recent papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997 and 1998) have given new impetus to the empirical
discussion on the importance of regulations regarding the rights of creditors over the assets of
borrowers, by providing very valuable data on the state of creditor rights regulations around the
world. The La Porta et al. (from here on LLSV) study collects information for 48 countries on
regulations regarding creditor rights. Their sample roughly includes as many developed as
developing countries. LLSV construct an index that summarizes regulations determining creditor
rights to control collateral in case firms file for reorganization or bankruptcy. They study: i) if
regulations impose an automatic stay on assets in case of reorganization; ii) if secured creditors
have the right to be paid first in case of bankruptcy; iii) if regulations force firms to consult with
creditors before filing for reorganization; and iv) if regulations force a removal of the firm’s
management during reorganization. A positive response to each of the four elements of the index
is interpreted as creditor rights protection. In short, these regulations provide an adequate picture
of how regulation protects creditors. The LLSV study goes beyond collateral repossesion
exclusively since it focuses on total asset liquidation in case of bankruptcy. In that sense, their
discussion is even more general than that of the previous section.
Recently, Galindo and Micco (2001) increased the coverage of the LLSV study to include
most Latin American countries. Figure 3 shows the index for Latin American countries and
provides information on OECD countries and on South East Asian countries extracted from the
LLSV sample.9
In general, one can see that creditor protection in Latin America is weak. Moreover,
when interacted with a measure of country overall law enforcement,
5 one can obtain an
indication of effective creditor protection, as shown in Figure 4. If rules and regulations are not
enforced, creditor protection will be low regardless of what is written in the bankruptcy
procedure law codes. In order to correct for these effects, we normalize the creditor rights
protection as well as the law enforcement indicator to the zero-one interval and multiply them.
This way we obtain a measure of creditor rights protection corrected by the degree to which, in
general, regulations are enforced. As above, higher values imply higher effective protection.
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5 The Kaufmann et al. (1999) rule of law variable is multiplied by the creditor rights index to obtain the effective
creditor rights measure.10
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Once law enforcement is taken into account, the difference between Latin America and
the rest of the world is magnified.  The impact of these regulations on credit markets is studied in
the next section.
4. Creditor Rights and Credit Markets: Empirical Evidence
The LLSV index has been used in several studies.  Several questions have been addressed. LLSV
examine the impact of creditor rights regulations on the size of credit markets and explore also
the determinants of creditor rights. With respect to the latter, they find that French origin
countries tend to have weaker protection than Anglo Saxon ones. Padilla and Requejo (2000)
also use the LLSV data set to further explore the relationship between credit market breadth and
creditor protection, and additionally investigate the impact of creditor protection on interest rates,
bad loans and loan provisions. Galindo and Micco (2001) explore once again the impact of rules
and regulations on credit market breadth using an extended sample, but also explore the role of
creditor rights in magnifying or not the impact of economy-wide shocks on credit market
fluctuations. This section explores recent empirical evidence regarding the macroeconomic
issues.11
4.1 Creditor Rights and Credit Markets Breadth
LLSV estimate regressions in which the breadth of the credit market, measured as the ratio of
debt to GNP, is explained by a set of controls including GDP growth, the size of the economy
and law enforcement, and their measure of creditor rights protection. They find that this last
variable plays a significant role in the determination of the size of credit markets. However,
when including additional macroeconomic controls, Padilla and Requejo (2000) conclude that
the creditor rights index loses its explanatory power, casting doubts on the La Porta et al. results.
Galindo and Micco (2001) replicate the LLSV and Padilla and Requejo studies using the
extended data set and find significant evidence of the impact of creditor rights regulations on
credit market breadth, even when controlling for macroeconomic factors. Figure 5 provides a
basic reason for their findings. An apparent positive correlation is observed between the ratio of
private credit to GNP and effective creditor rights protection.



































Source: La Porta et al. (1997,1998) and Galindo and Micco (2001).
Their empirical results are reported in Table 1. Regressions similar to Padilla and
Requejo (2000), but for a richer sample, are shown. Padilla and Requejo’s specifications are
based on LLSV, who regress the ratio of debt to GNP on four variables: the log of current GNP
to capture scale effects; average growth rates of the previous decades to capture the fact that
financial systems grow much more in more dynamic economies; rule of law; and the creditor
rights index. Padilla and Requejo extend the set of regressors to include inflation and12
government surplus as measures of policy performance. Galindo and Micco’s sample includes
nearly 20 more countries than the previous studies. Unlike the Padilla and Requejo study, they
find that creditor rights are a significant determinant of the size of credit markets. Column 1
reports the econometric results when including rule of law and the creditor rights index
separately. Column 2 uses the effective creditor rights index. The effective creditor rights index
appears highly significant, and the creditor rights variable in itself appears significant also. Both
of these results confirm the LLSV findings that were previously questioned in the creditor rights
empirical literature. Countries with higher creditor protection and with higher law enforcement
tend to have deeper credit markets than those where credit protection is low.
Table 1. Cross Country Regressions
Dependent Variable: Private Credit / GNP
Estimation Method: OLS
GDP Growth -0.029 -0.028
0.021 0.023




Government Surplus/GDP 0.0128 * 0.012
0.0073 0.008
Efective Creditor Rights 0.479 ***
0.165
Rule of Law 0.694 ***
0.158
Creditor Rights 0.184 *
0.105




F test (Whole Regression) 12.06 10.03
Prob > F 0.00 0.00
F test (Creditor Rights + Rule of Law) 10.84
Prob > F 0.00
Obs 55 55
*** Significant at 1%
**  Significant at 5%








           Source: Galindo and Micco (2001).13
In order to provide some intuition about the magnitude of the impact of creditor rights
regulations we simulate the impact of increasing creditor effective protection on the credit
market. The first set of bars in Figure 6 shows the ratio of credit to GNP in 1999. The second
(striped) set of bars shows the contribution to the credit to GNP ratio of improving effective
creditor rights to the South East Asia level. The figure also shows the average impact of
increasing creditor protection in OECD countries.
Figure 6. Contribution of Increasing Effective Creditor Protection
























The average impact of increasing effective creditor protection in Latin American and the
Caribbean is close to 20 points of the ratio of credit to GNP respectively, that is, from nearly
35% to 56% (a 59% increase in the ratio).  In other words, the average size of credit markets
would increase by over half if effective creditor protection were enhanced. This happens mainly
because, in general, law enforcement is extremely low in Latin American countries. According to
Kaufmann et al. (1999), the average value for the rule of law variable for Latin America and the
Caribbean once it has been normalized to the 0-1 range is 0.42, while taking values of 0.83 and
0.63 for OECD countries and South East Asia, respectively. It is worthwhile noticing that these
results come from a regression that controls for growth, the size of the economy, and additional14
macroeconomic imbalances such as inflation and fiscal deficits, which are also important
determinants of financial depth.
In  countries with extremely low effective creditor protection such as Colombia, Haiti,
Mexico, Guatemala, Paraguay and Venezuela, the effect of increasing creditor protection and
law enforcement simultaneously is to nearly double their credit market’s size. Our results suggest
that most of the difference between the size of credit markets in Latin America and developed
countries comes from institutional issues.
4.2 Creditor Rights and the Credit Cycle
Galindo and Micco also explore the impact of creditor protection on the volatility of credit. The
motivation for their analysis is shown in Figure 7. As can be seen, there is a strong correlation
between the volatility of credit and the effective protection of creditor rights.
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Source: Galindo and Micco (2001).
The model derived in Galindo and Micco (2001) suggests that the credit cycle is
smoother in countries with higher creditor rights than in those with low protection. The intuition,
as reported above, is that weak creditor protection can exacerbate the increase in credit risk that
comes naturally in recessions. To test the validity of this proposition, they construct a panel of
information for the 1990-1999 period for 55 countries.15
Their theoretical model suggests that the elasticity of credit growth with respect to overall
shocks is a function of creditor protection. They proxy the state of nature by using a measure of
foreign shocks equal to the weighted growth rate of GDP of trading partners. In order to capture
the changing nature of the coefficient across different legal regimes they interact the state of the
economy proxy variable with the creditor rights variable, as predicted by the model. To expand
the empirical model they also include additional controls such as the change in the rate of
inflation and the government’s surplus in their specification.  Table 2 reports their results.
Columns 1 and 3 show their findings using the effective aggregate index of creditor rights
conditions. Column 3 includes the additional macro controls. Their results suggest that an
increase in “effective” creditor rights reduces the amplitude of the real credit cycle.
Columns 2 and 4 report similar results considering the creditor rights index and the rule
of law index separately. Their results stand up even when controlling for macroeconomic
conditions. An increase in creditor protection reduces the impact of shocks on the credit market.
Table 2. Panel Data Results
Estimation Method: OLS
Dependent Variable: ∆∆∆∆ Ln(Real Private Credit)
Explanatory Variables I II III IV
Foreign Shock 6.44 *** 10.17 *** 6.84 *** 11.50 ***
1.95 3.35 2.17 3.84
Foreign Shock*Cred_Index -6.16 *** -7.37 ***
2.11 2.30
Foreign shock*Creditor Rights -1.14 * -1.16 *
0.63 0.69
Foreign shock*Rule of Law -5.20 * -7.31 ***
2.93 2.78
∆∆∆∆ Ln(Inf) -0.10 * -0.10 *
0.05 0.05
Gov Surplus/GDP 6.48E-03 *** 6.35E-03 ***
1.76E-03 1.70E-03
Constant 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.05 *** 0.05 ***
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
R
2 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.10
F test (Whole Regression) 7.07 4.78 9.06 7.42
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F test (Creditor Rights + Rule of Law) 3.85 4.69
Prob > F 0.02 0.01
Obs 568 568 421 421
*** Significant at 1%
**  Significant at 5%
*   Significant at 10%
Source: Galindo and Micco (2001).16
5. Additional Considerations
The discussion above refers to creditor rights, that is to the ability of banks to take over the assets
of the debtor in case she defaults. In that sense the previous analysis deals with an important
facet of the role of regulations in credit extension. Once collateral is pledged, can it be
repossessed in case of default (in particular of bankruptcy/reorganization)? This, however, is not
the only channel through which regulation affects the ability of collateral to reduce problems
derived from information asymmetries. Another important role of regulation is concerned with
how it limits the set of assets that may be used as collateral.  A priori, one would suspect that the
type of goods should not be restricted, and that regulation should be directed to expand the
family of assets that can be pledged as a credit guarantee.
Interestingly enough, this variety of goods is restricted in many Latin American
countries.  Figure 8 shows an index based on a survey conducted recently by the Inter-American
Development Bank and (IDB) and the Federacion Latinoamericana de Bancos (FELABAN). The
information plotted measures restrictions to collateral use in Latin American countries. The
index is made up of four components: i) the existence of restrictions regarding the types of assets
that can be pledged as collateral, ii) restrictions on the use and location of the assets, iii) the
obligation to register guarantees legally, and iv) the non-development of alternatives to physical
assets as collateralizable. The Appendix summarizes the findings on each of these fronts.
Figure 8. Restrictions on Collateral Use
























In general one can see that there are diverse restrictions to the use of collateral.
Unfortunately, this information is available for only a few Latin American countries and does not
allow for extensive econometric analysis. For econometric purposes we rely on the LLSV type
indexes which have world coverage, knowing in advance that they reflect deeper issues
regarding collateral use and expropriation, at least for Latin American countries.
6. Conclusions
Creditor protection in Latin American countries is low. Following the methodology developed
by La Porta et al. we construct a creditor rights index for most Latin American and Caribbean
countries.  We show that creditor protection in Latin America is low when compared to
international standards, especially when compared to Southeast Asian countries. In order to
obtain a measure of effective creditor protection, the creditor rights index is interacted with a
measure of overall law enforcement. After doing this, the difference between Latin America and
other regions of the world is exacerbated, which means that comparatively creditors in Latin
America are unprotected not only because of lack of proper regulations, but also because of
overall low law enforcement.
This paper reviews empirical evidence on the impact of creditor rights regulations on
credit market breadth and the credit cycle. It confirms results that were questioned regarding the
impact of creditor rights regulations on the size of credit markets, and shows that the degree to
which creditors are protected has a significant impact on the potential size of credit crunches.
Simulations suggest that the average credit to GDP ratio for Latin America could be doubled if
creditor rights regulations were put in place and law enforcement increased to developing
country levels.
Additionally, this paper reviews new evidence on the impact of regulations on credit
cycles. It shows that creditor rights play an important role, by exacerbating credit risk in
countries where creditor rights are not protected, and hence inducing an over-reaction of credit
markets to exogenous shocks.18
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Appendix: Difficulty of Using and Taking Over Collateral—
                   IDB-FELABAN Survey Evidence
1. Does the law impose restrictions on the type of assets used as collateral?
Country Yes No Excluded Assets







Ecuador  Family assets. Assets with property
limitations. Non commercial assets.
El Salvador  Equity from the same bank, from other
banks or from enterprises belonging to
the same financial conglomerate
Guatemala 
Mexico  Family assets.
Nicaragua  Equity of firms linked to the bank.
Panama 
Peru  1/50% of deposits CTS; fixed assets of
financial sector firms; assets from
minors; un-exproriable assets or
intangibles appointed by law, equity
from the same bank.
Dominican Rep. 
Uruguay 
Venezuela  Own equity.22





































4.  Have instruments that substitute for the use of tangible assets as collateral been
developed?
Country Yes No Which
Argentina 
Bolivia  REPO
Brazil  Cédula de crédito bancario, cesión
fiduciaria and securitization
Chile  Warrants
Colombia  Fiducia en garantía, bonos de
prenda, aceptaciones bancarias (en
Colombia REPO.
Costa Rica  Fideicomisos
Ecuador  Fideicomisos
El Salvador 




Peru  Warrant; REPOS;  Fideicomisos de




Venezuela  Fideicomisos; Reportos